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Why an animal has this characteristic we do not know. The theory of natural selection would, indeed, suggest that *if* the young of a species remain helpless for a long period, that species is more likely to survive if the male remains with the female and aids her to defend the young. But this would only mean that a primarily unfavorable variation—helpless infancy—was accompanied by another variation which in some degree offset its disadvantages. The latter variation can not have been *caused* by its effect—the better protection of the young; and it therefore is not explained by that effect. And it must, as Rousseau's observation suggests, have manifested itself primarily as an instinct to continue with the same mate or (in the case of the male, in some species) mates, *before* the birth of offspring. Fiske fell into an extraordinary inversion of causal relations, and at the same time missed the fact that really needed to be accounted for, when he wrote that "one effect [of lengthened infancy] of stupendous importance" was that, among our "half-human forefathers," as "helpless babyhood came more and more to depend on parental care, the fleeting sexual relationships established among mammals were gradually exchanged for permanent relations."

As an explanation of the origin of the family, then, Fiske's theory was neither new nor true. Nor did it show the "value," in the sense of the indispensability, of prolonged infancy, even as a means to man's greater intellectual attainments. It was not evident that the continued plasticity requisite for the learning-process need be inseparable from physical helplessness.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Nietzsche, sa Vie et sa Pensée. Vol. III; *Le Pessimisme Esthétique de Nietzsche, sa Philosophie à l'Époque Wagnérienne.* CHARLES ANDLER. Paris: Éditions Bossard. 1921. Pp. 390.

Nietzsche's mental curiosity knew no bounds. So, difference of opinion might well arise over the crowding recitals of Volume II (*cf.* this JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, No. 11), especially with reference to the relative importance of the influences exerted by persons and, no less, by ideas "in the air." Nevertheless, such opportunities for divergence, seeing that they are capable of control to some extent, pale when we come to Volume III with its attempt at synthetic treatment of the Nietzschean "philosophy," and its search (inevitable it would seem), for "system" (*cf.* Bibliographical Note,

p. 20). The volume contains an Introduction (discussing the "philosophy"): three Books—"The Origins and Renaissance of Tragedy"; "The Origins and Renaissance of Philosophy"; "The Origins and Renaissance of Civilization": and a Conclusion (concerned chiefly with Nietzsche's pet idea of a "philosophy of civilization").

The Introduction assumes, *sans phrases*, that Nietzsche was a philosopher; and proceeds to an interesting exhibit of his relation to "system." Andler takes care to emphasize the four styles of composition and, as concerns "system," points out that "an invisible force tends to weld the numerous fragments." Therefore, in his reconstruction, he confesses to "preoccupation with the history of ideas, not of literary fragments" (p. 27 note). He finds that three Periods emerge successively: "Romantic Pessimism" (1869-76); "Sceptical Positivism" (1876-81); "Reconstruction" (1882-8). The question whether Nietzsche ever thought philosophically is not raised and, although the likeness to Plato finds recognition (*cf.* Bk. II., Ch. II., Sect. IV.), perhaps for this very reason, the approach is that of a literary man rather than of a philosophical expert. Nay, the hand takes color from the dye in which it works. For, the emotion of superior spirits "*n'est que l'élan irrésistible avec lequel leur esprit se hâte vers le terme où le raisonnement vulgaire s'achemine avec une lenteur réfléchie*" (p. 16). In short, we have a continuation (raised to the *n*th power, if you please,) of prepotent Romantic *Kulturgeschichte*, sublimely stepping from peak to peak in seven-leagued boots. And yet, the apostle of "extreme relativism" is to arrive at an absolute.

"M'insegnavate come l'uom' s'eterna."

We must have patience for a while, hoping to find some resolution of the *impasse* as the drama unfolds further.

Chapter I of Book I gives a straightforward account of views about the origin of Greek tragedy, and of Nietzsche's attitude to the problem. There is an informing philological note on his projected Hellenic writings, and on the seven plans for the *Birth of Tragedy*, itself a fragment of the larger work on the Greeks, never written. The hesitation due to clash between ideas derived from Schopenhauer and Wagner receives due consideration. Nietzsche's well-known judgments on the parts played respectively by Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides-Socrates are summarized neatly. Chapter II tells why Nietzsche saw the resurrection of Greek tragedy in the Wagnerian drama, explaining the parallel factors of the "Dionysiac soul," the "faculty for mythology," and the "artistic audience." Art proves once more that men are better

than "voracious and monstrous" Nature. Chapter III gives a competent summary of the "quarrel over Greek tragedy" resultant upon the scrap—the name is not too undignified—between Nietzsche, Wilamowitz, Rohde, and Wagner. Having assessed the rights and wrongs, Andler proceeds to show how this youthful *emeute* determined the positions of Wilamowitz and Rohde throughout life, and concludes with an outline of recent tendencies in investigation, tracing the dead hand of Nietzsche in many ways.

Book II treats Philosophy after similar fashion, delineating Nietzsche's attitude ("the philosopher is the physician of *Kultur*"), and his peculiar views about the Pre-Socratics and Socrates, in Chapter I. Chapter II brings us at one fell swoop to modern philosophy, with its "*savants* submerged in the infinitely little," Schopenhauer the bright, particular exception. But, whatever his intellectual power, the crass vulgarities of the Frankfort curmudgeon prevented him from being the philosophical Moses. Hence, as Andler points out, following Frau Föster (p. 155), the ideal thinker was drawn by Nietzsche from himself, decked with certain traits from Wagner—not Goethe. And so we are led to the "Platonism of Nietzsche," interpreted persuasively. With Chapter III, "The First System of Nietzsche, or Philosophy of Illusion," we find ourselves, for the first time decisively, in full tide of controversial affairs. Differing sharply from Raoul Richter, for example, who says that Nietzsche was "unsystematic, confused, and dilettante" at this stage, Andler affirms "the total cohesion of his thought" (p. 172), admitting the audacity of the standpoint. The remainder of the volume is, in effect, proof. Indeed, so much so that, on p. 302, when the conclusion of the whole matter looms in sight, Andler can affirm, Nietzsche's "systematic thought is of marvellous continuity."

The causes of the "illusions" of knowledge, morality and art exposed, we find that, between 1870 and 1874, Nietzsche fell back upon an "impersonal memory" and a "collective imagination," taking metonymy for cool reason; in fact, falling victim to an obvious phase of the substance-attribute fallacy, not abandoned till after 1876. The general spirit is that of Schopenhauer, tempered by the Wagnerian dogma of musical ecstasy as a "veritable philosophic revelation." But Lamarek and Emerson work like yeast, with the result that Nietzsche begins to "slip." He realizes that "transformations" are imperative, and can be accomplished by the "internal energy which upholds all life." Accordingly, a "practical" metaphysic, in the form of a theory of civilization, asserts itself. Book III is devoted to a "reconstruction" of this.

Chapter I deals with Greek civilization, which seconds Schopenhauer's psychology, but contradicts Nietzsche's nascent conception of value (p. 225). Chapters II and III show that, in face of modern philistinism, Wagner plays the rôle of a "counter-Alexander," while Germany may be destined to enact that of a messiah. We learn that the idea of "value" may be reconstituted by the "immense reserve energy of heroes, thinkers, artists." But, to this end, these seminal persons must rise superior to the three great ogres—the State, Capitalism, and Science, bemused by the fatal belief that man has a natural right to happiness. The hodmen of feudalized science know as little of real life as their more ignorant contemporaries. Debility or cynicism leave their blighting trail everywhere. Even the fair humanities produce mere "*des hommes enrégimentés*" (p. 390). "Reconstruction" of the *Prometheus* fragment issues in suggestions as to the new culture, and presages the fateful doctrine of "eternal return."

Thanks to a misprint, common to text and to *Table des Matières*, there is no Chapter IV. Chapter V exhibits Nietzsche's plan for the reorganization of education, necessary to rid the innocent youth of "false culture, the journalistic spirit, and superficial rhetoric" (p. 305). Chapter VI gives a subtle exposition of the part which Nietzsche expected Bayreuth to play in this transformation, and indicates how a "New Wagnerism" formulated itself in his mind, rendering a break with the composer inevitable" (p. 318). Nietzsche's limitations and positive errors at the moment are set forth (p. 326 f.). Despite them, however, Wagner's "dynamism" prefigures *Zarathustra*. The outcome of the first period is the conviction that a superior civilization must be developed; and even Schopenhauer was full of obscurity on this point, while Wagner, after arousing great expectations, fell from grace. So Nietzsche came to sense the need for other guides, and turned to the French moralists.

The Conclusion furnishes a most instructive account of Nietzsche's attitude towards the problem of civilization; of his debt to Greek culture, and to the Greek intellect which followed the question whithersoever it led; and of his personal philosophy at this time. Nietzsche committed himself to no choice between "intellectualism, naturalism, and personalism," finding defects in all. He proceeded to correct them by a new apriorism of values, simulating the system of the elder Fichte—a very suggestive remark, not elaborated! Recall von Hartmann's unacknowledged plunder from the same source! This philosophy, motivated by "liberty of the spirit," brought him into conflict (or competition) with the personal revela-

tion of Jesus. "*La loi de génie serait hétéronomie pour la foule. La loi des foules est hétéronomie pour le génie*" (p. 379).

Two questions, and one request, are in order. What are we to hear of the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach, who dominated thought in Germany and Teutonic Switzerland 1845-65? whose *Wesen des Christenthums* was "the third crow of the cock of the spirit of German liberty"? (cf. *Washington University Studies*, Vol. IX, No. 1 (St. Louis, 1921), pp. 32 f.). He it was who gave Wagner his start. Of his less important oldest brother, Anselm, the archæologist, we heard a good deal in volume II (pp. 229 f.). Again, what direct contact, if any, had Nietzsche with Count Arthur de Gobineau? This seems to me a question at once most obscure and most seductive. Finally, I beg M. Andler to furnish a complete index. His volume must be thumbed by all Nietzsche scholars and, for this purpose, the present *tables des matières* are quite inadequate.

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Philosophy and the New Physics. An Essay on the Relativity Theory and the Theory of Quanta. LOUIS ROUGIER. Translated by Morton Masius. Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son and Company. 1921. Pp. xv + 159.

The title of this essay in the original French—*La Matérialization de l'Énergie*—is more exactly descriptive of it than the English substitute. There is in fact almost nothing in the book in the way of metaphysical generalization from the physical theories that are examined; and there is but a page or two of comment on the importance for physical theory of the pragmatist conception of truth. The book should be none the less interesting to philosophical readers. Those who have given some serious attention to recent advances in physics will be glad to find this well-ordered and illuminating summary. Those who would like to set about the study will find the field mapped out for them, and a useful bibliography of French, as well as German, books and articles. And those whose interests lie elsewhere will find here the means of "speaking with an appearance of wisdom" upon these important topics.

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